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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The pact signed on 15 October 2012 between the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine gov-
ernment is a breakthrough in many ways but is far from a 
final peace. As with earlier texts signed over years of ne-
gotiations, this one – the “framework agreement” – defers 
several tough questions and it is unclear how, if ever, they 
will be resolved. At stake is the creation of a genuinely 
autonomous region in Muslim-majority Mindanao for the 
various ethnic groups collectively known as the Bangsa-
moro, with more powers, more territory and more control 
over resources. The framework agreement envisions a new 
government for the troubled Muslim south that would raise 
its own revenues and have its own police and judiciary. It 
maps out a multi-step process to create this new entity by the 
time President Benigno Aquino III’s term ends in 2016. The 
obstacles ahead are huge. Politics in Mindanao or Manila 
could get in the way, and it may be impossible to devolve 
sufficient power to the Bangsamoro government without 
running afoul of the constitution. The MILF is unlikely to 
surrender its arms until the process is complete. 
Peace talks with the 12,000-strong MILF, the country’s 
largest and best armed insurgent organisation, began in 1997. 
They have moved glacially ever since and were interrupt-
ed three times by serious fighting: in 2000, 2003 and 2008. 
The collapse in 2008 had damaging political implications 
because it hardened the positions of all stakeholders on crit-
ical elements of a final peace. These include the territory for 
a new Bangsamoro homeland and its powers vis-à-vis Ma-
nila. At the centre of the storm was a sweeping text known 
as the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD), whose provisions the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional; it was never formally signed. It was difficult 
to get the peace process back on track afterwards because 
the MILF insisted that discussions resume from where they 
had left off. 
President Aquino, who took office in June 2010, had no 
interest in repeating these mistakes. His government would 
consult and reassure potential spoilers, and any deal reached 
would have to be legally, constitutionally and politically wa-
tertight. The government strategy from early on was to find 
a way to move the MILF away from the terms of the failed 
2008 agreement. Aquino, elected on an anti-corruption plat-
form, also did not want a peace pact to run the risk of wors-
ening governance problems in the south. The MILF, proud 
of its tenacity and consistency in the protracted talks, was 
initially unwilling to adjust to this new approach. 
The negotiations only started to make real progress in mid-
2012 when the parties began to draft a text that embodied all 
points they could agree on, while setting aside everything 
they did not. With Malaysia, which facilitates the negotia-
tions, and other international third parties to the peace pro-
cess nudging the MILF and the Aquino government closer 
together, the text of the framework agreement fell into place. 
When the hard part came – territory – the MILF was ready 
to take a leap of faith. It agreed to provisions that are tricky 
to sell to its supporters in Mindanao but that give all Bang-
samoro a chance to decide whether they accept the terms of 
a final peace. 
For the Aquino government, it was important to bring the 
peace process back to the Philippines after years of confi-
dential negotiations abroad and to give other voices in Min-
danao a chance to be heard. The MILF’s leaders, who claim 
to represent all Bangsamoro despite the undeniably frac-
tious politics of the region, have agreed to make space for 
others to sit at the table and help them craft the new law that 
will create a Bangsamoro government. If all goes well, this 
will increase the popular legitimacy of the peace process; 
if it does not, and the Bangsamoro cannot even agree among 
themselves, it will do serious damage to the idea of region-
al autonomy. The next hurdle will be passing this new law 
through Congress. The president’s popularity and consid-
erable political capital will help with stakeholders in Ma-
nila, and the depth of his commitment to securing peace 
in Mindanao will become clear when constitutional issues 
inevitably rear their head. If the process stalls at any stage, 
it may be hard for the MILF leadership to control its com-
manders and retain popular support. 
For the Bangsamoro, the framework agreement holds out 
the possibility of peace, a responsive government and a 
better, more prosperous future for their children. Nothing 
has changed yet, but there is real hope that this time will 
be different. The MILF, the government and their interna-
tional partners need to work together to ensure those hopes 
are not dashed. 
Jakarta/Brussels, 5 December 2012
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 15 October 2012 framework agreement elaborates a 
sweeping vision of a new government for the Bangsamoro 
that will be vastly different in structure and more powerful 
than the existing but impotent Autonomous Region in Mus-
lim Mindanao (ARMM), which Manila created by fiat in 
the late 1980s.1 It touches on a wider range of issues than 
any other text previously signed by the parties.2  
 
1 According to the 1987 constitution, promulgated under Presi-
dent Corazon Aquino (the current president’s mother), an au-
tonomous region in Muslim Mindanao can be created through 
the passage of a law, called an organic act, in Congress fol-
lowed by plebiscites in those areas to be included. The other 
area entitled to an autonomous area is the Cordilleras in the 
northern Philippines. In 1987, Congress passed Republic Act 
6734, known as the organic act of ARMM. In a plebiscite held 
in 1989, the provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in 
Central Mindanao voted to join the ARMM, as did the provinces 
of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu archipelago (the third island 
province, Basilan, did not). This was not the first attempt at re-
gional autonomy in the southern Philippines. In 1979, the mar-
tial law government of Ferdinand Marcos unilaterally imple-
mented the first major agreement signed with a Muslim insur-
gent organisation – the 1976 Tripoli agreement – by creating 
two separate, non-contiguous autonomous regions, one with a 
capital in Cotabato City (the hub of Central Mindanao), the 
other with a capital in Zamboanga City (the jumping off point 
for the Sulu archipelago). In the 1989 plebiscite, however, nei-
ther city chose to join ARMM although the seat of the regional 
government is in the former. Another major city, Marawi, in 
Lanao del Sur, also stayed out. 
2 For earlier stages of the peace process and related issues, see 
Crisis Group Asia Reports N°225, The Philippines: Local Poli-
tics in the Sulu Archipelago and the MILF Peace Process, 15 
May 2012; N°213, The Philippines: Indigenous Rights and the 
MILF Peace Process, 22 November 2011; Asia Briefings 
N°125, The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace in Minda-
nao?, 3 August 2011; N°119, The Philippines: Back to the Ta-
ble, Warily, in Mindanao, 24 March 2011; N°88, The Philip-
pines: Running in Place in Mindanao, 16 February 2009; N°83, 
The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, 23 Octo-
ber 2008; Asia Reports N°152, The Philippines: Counter-insur-
gency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao, 14 May 2008; N°110, 
Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, 
19 December 2005; and N°80, Southern Philippines Back-
grounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, 13 July 2004. 
It stands in sharp contrast to the 2008 MOA-AD, which 
defined an “ancestral domain” – the boundaries of a future 
Bangsamoro homeland – but fell apart when it ran up against 
other, more powerful interests. Territory has been the tough-
est issue in the peace talks. The 2008 agreement provided 
a solution that was highly favourable to the MILF because 
it could have included a massive swathe of Mindanao in the 
Bangsamoro homeland, had the peace process not collapsed. 
The MOA-AD was the best deal the MILF was ever going 
to get. To satisfy its fighters and supporters, the leadership 
cannot sign anything that would represent a clear step back 
from that agreement.  
The other reference point is the 1996 final peace agreement 
between the Philippine government and the older, now weak-
er Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which did not 
significantly change the powers or boundaries of ARMM.3 
The MILF needs a deal that is better than what the MNLF 
got. Between those two imperatives – and the limits of 
the constitution – there is not a lot of room to negotiate. 
The framework agreement is remarkable for two reasons. 
First, the MILF made a major concession in agreeing to a 
formula for determining which areas would be under a 
new Bangsamoro government. If the MOA-AD was reve-
latory for the territorial scope of a future homeland, the 
framework agreement is surprising because of the process 
it sets out for securing the consent of the Bangsamoro to join 
this new entity. Second, the new pact makes it clear the 
present ARMM will be gone by the time President Aquino 
leaves office in 2016. The framework agreement charts a 
path forward for the parties to replace it with the new Bang-
 
3 The 1996 agreement was never fully implemented. In 2001, 
Congress passed an amendment to the organic act of ARMM 
(Republic Act 9054), supposedly reflecting the 1996 agreement 
but in fact dramatically watering down its terms. A plebiscite 
held that same year brought Basilan, but not its capital, Isabela 
City, into ARMM. Marawi City also joined. In Central Minda-
nao, six municipalities in Lanao del Norte, the province adjacent 
to Lanao del Sur, voted in favour, as did 39 barangays (villages) 
in six municipalities in North Cotabato, which borders Magu-
indanao. These areas have a Muslim majority population. How-
ever, the overall provincial results for Lanao del Norte and 
North Cotabato did not favour inclusion in ARMM, so these 
areas did not join at that time. 
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samoro government. The hard part, implementation, is only 
just beginning.  
Over the course of the peace talks, the Aquino government 
gradually became willing to see the MILF not just as its 
adversary across the negotiating table but as a partner for 
the years ahead. As for the MILF, its leaders have agreed 
to let other Bangsamoro, not all of whom are their friends, 
and Congress play a part in drafting the law that will cre-
ate the new region rather than negotiate everything in 
confidential talks. Yet the biggest problem of all – whether 
the powers the MILF wants can be accommodated by the 
constitution – is still up in the air. 
This report builds on Crisis Group’s earlier research on the 
peace process. Interviews with the negotiating teams, mem-
bers and supporters of the MILF, government and military 
officials, diplomats, civil society groups and others were 
conducted in Manila and Mindanao through 2011 and 2012.  
II. THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Talks under President Aquino did not get off to a promis-
ing start. In February 2011, the MILF submitted a proposal 
for a comprehensive peace that was essentially the failed 
2008 agreement with a new name.4 Prospects looked bright-
er when, on 4 August, the president met MILF Chairman 
al-Haj Murad Ebrahim in a one-on-one meeting in Tokyo, 
Japan.5 There, he conveyed his desire for a settlement and 
emphasised that the ideal window was before May 2013, the 
mid-point of his term.6 The signal was clear: the president 
wanted peace with the MILF as part of his legacy. But later 
that month, MILF negotiators promptly rejected the gov-
ernment’s counter-offer for a final peace.7 Talks then went 
into limbo. The third parties who attend the negotiations – 
the facilitator, a diplomat from Malaysia which has hosted 
the peace talks for the past decade and a small independent 
team of concerned governments and international non-go-
vernmental organisations known as the International Contact 
Group8 – tried to get the parties back to the table by back-
channelling and drawing up a matrix of common points 
between the proposals.  
 
4 Crisis Group interview, government negotiator, Manila, 30 
September 2011. 
5 This was the first time a sitting president had met the chair of 
the MILF. The negotiations are conducted via appointed five-
person negotiating panels, one for each side, which are sup-
ported by a technical secretariat. The chair of the government 
panel under President Aquino was Marvic Leonen, a respected 
law professor and constitutional expert; in late November 2012 
he was appointed to the Supreme Court. The chair of the MILF 
panel since 2003 is Mohagher Iqbal, a member of the MILF 
central committee.  
6 Under the 1987 constitution, presidents are elected for a sin-
gle, six-year term, with elections to the bicameral Congress 
every three years.  
7 This was the “3-for-1” proposal. The three components were: 
addressing social and economic development needs in a partic-
ipative manner; reforming legal and political environments to 
allow meaningful autonomy and self-governance; and acknowl-
edging the historical causes of conflict towards reconciliation. 
See “The GPH ‘3-for-1’ Proposal in the GPH-MILF peace ne-
gotiations”, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace 
Process, October 2011.  
8 For years, the facilitator was Datuk Othman Razak. In April 
2012, he was replaced by Tengku Dato’ Ab Ghafar Tengku 
Mohamed. The International Contact Group consists of the UK, 
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Centre for Humanitarian Dia-
logue, Conciliation Resources, The Asia Foundation and Mu-
hammadiyah (an Indonesian Islamic organisation). It was set up 
in late 2009. For more on the International Contact Group, see 
Steve Rood, “Internationals, Malaysia, and Negotiations for 
Peace in the Philippines”, The Asia Foundation, 17 October 2012. 
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A firefight that killed nineteen soldiers, five MILF fighters 
and one civilian in mid-October demonstrated paradoxical-
ly both parties’ commitment to the peace talks. The incident 
happened on Basilan, one of the three island provinces of 
the Sulu archipelago which stretches from the western tip 
of Mindanao to eastern Malaysia – hundreds of kilometres 
away from the MILF stronghold of Central Mindanao. The 
military operation that triggered the clash was not coordi-
nated through the ceasefire mechanisms, but the outcry in 
Manila was immediate and condemnation of the MILF swift. 
The Central Mindanao-based leadership was angry that they 
were being blamed for the military’s mistakes.9 The inci-
dent could have torpedoed the talks, but as a member of the 
International Contact Group observed, the negotiations were 
bound to continue because “neither party wanted them to 
break down”.10 
The parties next met in early November. The MILF had 
been insisting that President Aquino continue the peace 
process from the consensus points that had led to the failed 
2008 agreement.11 The government rejected that suggestion, 
but gradually came round to the MILF’s idea of proceed-
ing along four pillars: governance, wealth sharing, territory 
and the transition.12 The draft proposals that had been ex-
changed were still on the table, but would not be the focus 
of the negotiations. 
By February 2012, the parties had drafted a two-page dec-
laration on principles but then were unable to sign it at the 
next round in March because of disagreements over the 
wording.13 The negotiating teams were under pressure to 
demonstrate the talks were making progress and signing yet 
another interim agreement would buy time.14 Both sides 
were frustrated. The MILF team believed the government 
was still unwilling to fundamentally rethink the relationship 
of the Bangsamoro to the Philippine state. As an MILF ne-
 
9 For more on the incident, see Crisis Group Report, Local Poli-
tics in the Sulu Archipelago and the MILF Peace Process, op 
cit., pp. 10-11. The MILF and the government signed the Agree-
ment on the General Cessation of Hostilities in July 1997. It led 
to the creation of the Coordinating Committees of the Cessation 
of Hostilities (CCCH). These bodies allow the military to alert 
the MILF to its movements, and vice-versa. 
10 Crisis Group interview, Manila, 21 November 2011. 
11 Crisis Group interview, Manila, 21 November 2011. 
12 Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Davao, 21 and 27 No-
vember 2011. 
13 After February, the negotiating teams took the document back 
to President Aquino and Chairman Murad for their sign off. 
When they reconvened for the March round, the government 
had made four changes and the MILF panel members said they 
could not sign the declaration. Crisis Group interviews, various 
individuals involved in the negotiations, Cotabato City and 
Manila, 27, 29 and 30 March 2012. 
14 Crisis Group interview, member of the International Contact 
Group, Manila, 29 March 2012. 
gotiator put it at the time, “while there are discussions, there 
is no clear destination”.15 The government was anxious for 
a different reason: the negotiations were eating into the time 
it wanted to use for implementation, and the window before 
the May 2013 legislative polls was rapidly closing.16 When 
the parties finally signed the decision points on principles 
in April, few observers thought it amounted to much.17 
The breakthrough came when the ever-wary MILF started 
believing that President Aquino was willing to grant real 
power to the Bangsamoro and that it should seize the op-
portunity. In response, its negotiators displayed a pragma-
tism and flexibility that had not been evident before. The 
parties began drafting the framework agreement in earnest 
from July onwards, with the president and cabinet closely 
involved in approving text put forth by the government ne-
gotiators.18 By September, they had chosen a name for the 
new region: the Bangsamoro. The parties focused on what 
they agreed on, while setting aside the contentious issues 
for later. When the government finally put forward its stance 
on territory, there was enough momentum in the talks so the 
discussions did not break down, as they so often had before. 
 
15 Crisis Group interview, member of the MILF negotiating 
team, Cotabato City, 27 March 2012. 
16 Within the peace process office, the lead negotiator Leonen 
was saying that an agreement would have to be reached by Oc-
tober at the latest. Crisis Group interview, senior OPAPP offi-
cial, Manila, 29 March 2012. 
17 Crisis Group interviews, Manila-based journalist and diplo-
mats, Manila, May 2012. They split the difference on language; 
some of the government’s modifications were included, but the 
MILF’s preferred wording was used for the sentences on identi-
ty and ARMM. See “GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles 
as of April 2012”, 24 April 2012. 
18 Crisis Group interviews, Manila, 27-28 August 2012. 
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III. THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
The “framework agreement on the Bangsamoro” is divided 
into nine sections: establishment of the Bangsamoro; basic 
law; powers; revenue generation and wealth sharing; terri-
tory; basic rights; transition and implementation; normali-
sation; and “miscellaneous”. The last section states that the 
agreement cannot be implemented unilaterally and that the 
parties will complete the agreement by the end of 2012. Four 
supplementary annexes are still to come. 
Some provisions are largely the same as the controversial 
MOA-AD, while others are vastly different.19 Overall, the 
framework agreement provides much more detail on gov-
ernance. The most problematic parts of the failed 2008 
agreement are omitted. Then, much of the controversy cen-
tred on an appended list of territories outside ARMM where 
plebiscites would be held to determine if these areas would 
join a future Bangsamoro homeland.20 Christian politicians, 
representing settlers living in these areas who were angry no 
one had consulted them, petitioned the Supreme Court, 
prompting the ruling that killed the MOA-AD.21 Minda-
nao’s indigenous peoples also vehemently opposed the 2008 
agreement. They were angry the peace pact defined them as 
Bangsamoro despite their separate identity and decidedly 
poor relations with the MILF.22  
This time, a better definition of the Bangsamoro and a brief 
section on basic rights reassure indigenous peoples and 
 
19 For example, the language on reparations is almost identical. 
20 The MOA-AD listed 737 Muslim-majority villages (barangays) 
as “category A” and an additional 1,459 “conflict-affected are-
as” as “category B”. Residents in category A would vote on in-
clusion in a plebiscite to be held within twelve months; those in 
category B would vote 25 years later. See Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain, Territory Strand and Annex-
es; and Crisis Group Briefing, The Collapse of Peace in Min-
danao, op. cit., pp. 3-4. See map in Appendix A. 
21 The politicians behind the petitions were the then vice gover-
nor of North Cotabato, Emmanuel Pinol, and the mayor of 
Zamboanga City, Celso Lobregat. The MILF bases its territori-
al claims on Islamic political structures – sultanates – that ex-
isted centuries ago. Migration of Christian settlers from else-
where in the Philippines shrank Muslim-majority areas from 
the 1950s onwards. See Patricio N. Abinales, Making Minda-
nao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine 
Nation-State (Manila, 2004). 
22 Indigenous peoples are original inhabitants of Mindanao but 
did not convert to Islam centuries ago when other ethnic groups 
– now known as the Bangsamoro – did. The first line of a para-
graph-long definition of the Bangsamoro read: “It is the birth-
right of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to 
identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros’”. Mem-
orandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, Concepts and 
Principles, Article 1. For more, see Crisis Group Report, Indig-
enous Rights and the MILF Peace Process, op. cit. 
Christian settlers.23 Although the sections on the transition 
and territory come near the end of the text, their terms are 
crucial to understanding why some of the core issues of the 
peace process have been resolved; why others have not; and 
what will happen next.  
A. THE BASIC LAW, TRANSITION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION  
The framework agreement contains a multi-step process for 
implementation and more specifics will be in an annex. The 
president, with the support of Congress, will order the crea-
tion of a transition commission in late 2012 or early 2013. 
The MILF will appoint eight members, including the chair, 
while the government will select seven. All must be Bang-
samoro.24 The commission will have three tasks: drafting a 
basic law (to reflect the “Bangsamoro system of life”); pro-
posing amendments to the Philippine constitution; and co-
ordinating development programs in Bangsamoro commu-
nities, using two MILF-run institutions, the Bangsamoro 
Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) and the 
Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA).25 The MILF 
wants the transition commission to focus on drafting the 
basic law and drawing up proposed amendments to the con-
stitution. It believes the third task, overseeing development, 
is of lesser importance.26 
Once the basic law is complete, the president will certify 
it as an urgent bill in Congress.27 After its promulgation and 
ratification, the Bangsamoro transition authority will take 
 
23 The framework agreement reads: “The Parties recognize 
Bangsamoro identity. Those who at the time of conquest and 
colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of 
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands in-
cluding Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed or of 
full blood shall have the right to identify themselves as Bang-
samoro by ascription or self-ascription. Spouses and their de-
scendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice 
of other Indigenous peoples shall be respected”. Framework 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro, Section I (Establishment of the 
Bangsamoro), Article 5. See also Section VI (Basic Rights), 
Articles 1-3.  
24 This reflects another provision in the agreement: “[the basic 
law] shall be formulated by the Bangsamoro people and ratified 
by the qualified voters within its territory”. Framework Agree-
ment, op. cit., Section II (Basic Law), Article 4. 
25 The idea of “the basic law” is reminiscent of the Hong Kong-
China one country, two systems formula.  
26 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiator, Cotabato City, 30 
October 2012. 
27 However, Congress is not mentioned here, or anywhere else 
in the agreement. The basic law is, in effect, a new organic act 
for an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The govern-
ment accepted the MILF’s preferred term of “basic law” early 
in the negotiations. Crisis Group interview, senior government 
official, Manila, 27 January 2012.  
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over from the existing ARMM government, which will be 
dissolved. It will be in charge until the first regular elections 
under the new political arrangement in 2016. Throughout 
this process, the formal negotiating panels may continue to 
meet if there are problems that crop up that cannot be solved 
by the transition commission. They will remain in place until 
the parties sign an exit document signalling the framework 
agreement is fully implemented.28  
These provisions do not include an important guarantee 
made in the negotiations regarding the timeframe for the 
transition, although there may be more details forthcom-
ing. The government promised the MILF that the transi-
tion authority will be in power for at least one year, in other 
words, that it would be installed by mid-2015 at the latest. 
The MILF leadership may be tempted to try to accelerate 
the work of the transition commission so that the basic law 
will be in place sooner, giving the transition authority more 
time before the first regular election in 2016.29 
This matters deeply to the MILF because it has always in-
sisted that it should lead the transition authority and clashed 
with the government over the duration.30 The Aquino gov-
ernment’s desire to democratise the peace process collided 
with the MILF’s demands that it be allowed to run the new 
region and determine the content of the basic law. After the 
failure of the 2008 agreement, MILF leaders tried to reas-
sure sceptics within and outside Muslim Mindanao that they 
would be, in their words, “inclusive” even while insisting they 
should be in the “driver’s seat” during the transition. No one 
knows who they are willing to have as passengers. A nego-
tiator explained that “the MILF knows [its] limitations” and 
“need[s] to prepare for nation-building”.31 The Aquino gov-
ernment bought this line enough to let the MILF chair the 
transition commission. 
 
28 Framework Agreement, op. cit., Section VII (Transition and 
implementation). 
29 Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Cotabato City, 25 and 
27-31 October 2012.  
30 For example, a draft comprehensive compact submitted to 
the Arroyo government in early 2010 envisioned a six-year 
transition. In January 2012, the parties swapped roadmaps that 
differed substantially. The MILF envisioned a four-year Bang-
samoro transition authority that would draft a basic law to lay 
the legal foundations of the new homeland by 2015. At that 
point, the government would amend the constitution; the first 
regular elections under the new set-up would happen in May 
2016. The government’s roadmap had various transition bodies 
wrapping up their work within a year so a new organic act could 
be passed by Congress and approved in a plebiscite before elec-
tions, to include the MILF, in May 2013. Copies of the draft 
2010 comprehensive compact and roadmaps from January 2012 
made available to Crisis Group. 
31 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiators, Manila, 21 Janu-
ary 2012. 
The role of international actors in the peace process may 
also change. Discussions have begun among International 
Contact Group members about their future involvement, 
but they are waiting for direction from the parties.32 The 
mandate of the Malaysia-led International Monitoring Team 
(IMT), which helps enforce the longstanding ceasefire, is 
up for renewal in March 2013.33 It is likely to be extended, 
and the MILF would like its role to expand to monitoring 
humanitarian assistance and the overall implementation of 
the framework agreement.34 Most of its members have a 
military background; its composition and geographic remit 
would likely have to change if its mandate evolves.35 The 
Aquino administration has tended to perceive Malaysia as 
biased toward the MILF, but it may be more disposed to 
view Kuala Lumpur’s involvement positively now that the 
framework agreement has been signed.36 Still, the govern-
ment is keen to “domesticate, civilianise and streamline” 
the various bodies around the peace process, which could 
diminish Malaysia’s role, and create space for local civil 
society groups to participate.37 
B. TERRITORY 
The MILF and the Aquino government only intended for 
the framework agreement to determine procedures for mak-
ing further decisions and to map the way forward until the 
end of the president’s term. But territory was the one issue 
where details could not be deferred. On the one hand, the 
 
32 Crisis Group interviews, members of the International Con-
tact Group, Manila, 25 October and 2 November 2012. 
33 The implementing guidelines for the IMT were agreed in 
2001. The mandate is renewed annually. 
34 Press conference with Chairman al-Haj Murad Ebrahim, 
Camp Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, 27 October 
2012. Crisis Group interviews, military official and member of 
the MILF negotiating team, Cotabato City, 28 October 2012. 
See Framework Agreement, op. cit., Section VII, Article 11: 
“There will be created a third party monitoring team to be com-
posed of international bodies, as well as domestic groups to mon-
itor the implementation of all agreements”. 
35 Crisis Group interviews, various individuals involved in the 
peace process, Manila and Cotabato City, October-November 
2012. The IMT currently operates from Cotabato City, Iligan 
City, Zamboanga City, General Santos City and Davao City. 
Most lie outside the “core area” of the Bangsamoro.  
36 Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Cotabato City, 25 and 
28 October 2012. The Philippines and Malaysia have a long-
standing territorial dispute over Sabah. In the early years of the 
insurgency, Muslim rebels also trained in Malaysia. 
37 Four non-governmental organisations participate in the IMT 
through the civilian protection component, agreed by the parties 
in 2009. One is foreign, three are local. The Aquino govern-
ment has strong ties to civil society and would like them to be 
more involved, although some observers worry that Mindanao-
based groups are not impartial. Crisis Group interview, senior 
church official, Cotabato City, 31 October 2012. 
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government needed language that would make clear to 
Christian politicians that their areas would not be included. 
On the other, the MILF needed a formula that was vague 
enough so its leaders could prove they were getting a better 
deal than the MNLF did in 1996.38 
The framework agreement defines the “core area” of the 
Bangsamoro as: 
 the present ARMM; 
 the six municipalities in Lanao del Norte that voted 
yes in the 2001 plebiscite on expansion of ARMM;39 
 all barangays in six municipalities in North Cotabato 
that also voted yes in same plebiscite;40 
 Cotabato City (the hub of Central Mindanao) and Isa-
bela City (the main city on Basilan); and 
 all other contiguous areas where there is a resolution 
of the local government unit or a petition of at least 10 
per cent of the qualified voters in the area asking for 
their inclusion at least two months prior to the conduct 
of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and 
the process of delimitation of the Bangsamoro.41 
The next article explained “ratification”: 
The Parties shall work together in order to ensure the 
widest acceptability of the Bangsamoro Basic Law as 
drafted by the Transitory Commission and the core ar-
eas mentioned in the previous paragraph, through a 
process of popular ratification among all the Bang-
samoro within the areas for their adoption. An interna-
tional third party monitoring team shall be present to 
ensure that the process is free, fair, credible, legitimate 
and in conformity with international standards.42 
This rolls back one of the core assumptions of the negoti-
ations: the inhabitants of the existing ARMM would be 
included in whatever political set-up resulted from a final 
peace with the MILF and would not need to vote again on 
regional autonomy arrangements. This underpinned the 
MOA-AD: any new plebiscites would happen only outside 
 
38 Crisis Group interview, Manila, 28 August 2012. 
39 The municipalities are Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tago-
loan and Tangkal. The 2001 plebiscite was part of the govern-
ment’s unilateral implementation of the 1996 final peace 
agreement with the MNLF. See fn. 3 above. 
40 The municipalities are Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawa-
yan, Pikit and Midsayap. They border Maguindanao province. 
For more information on the demographics, see Rudy B. Rodil, 
“ANGAY-ANGAY LANG: Comments on the Framework Agree-
ment”, Mindanews.com, 14 October 2012. 
41 Framework Agreement, op. cit., Section V (Territory), Arti-
cle 1. 
42 Ibid, Article 2. 
ARMM, but not within.43 But the Supreme Court disagreed. 
It pointed out that according to the article on the creation of 
autonomous regions in the constitution, past plebiscites were 
not valid if the existing autonomous region was going to be 
replaced by a new one.44 Therefore, the 2008 territorial for-
mula could not be recycled for the framework agreement. 
The Aquino government had other concerns too. The pro-
cess of expansion beyond ARMM needed to be open-ended, 
so that local governments could opt in over time rather than 
their participation being preordained on a certain date. The 
mechanism had to be democratic, could not antagonise an-
yone and, because of the Supreme Court ruling, had to be 
compatible with the constitution.45 But the MILF has always 
resisted the idea that expansion beyond ARMM proceed 
via “constitutional processes”.46 Even so, its leaders realised 
as the MOA-AD was unravelling that not all the areas where 
plebiscites would have been held wanted to join.47 And both 
the MILF and the government knew that the territory that 
might have resulted from the 2008 agreement was likely 
to be a non-contiguous, unwieldy patchwork of barangays 
across Central Mindanao and beyond. The Aquino admin-
 
43 The proposed “core area” under the MOA-AD was the exist-
ing ARMM plus the six municipalities in Lanao del Norte that 
voted yes in the 2001 plebiscite. Any new plebiscites would 
only happen outside this core area. See maps in Appendices A 
and B. 
44 “That the present components of the ARMM and the above-
mentioned municipalities [in Lanao del Norte] voted for inclu-
sion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite 
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what 
these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, 
not the BJE [Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, the name for the new 
region envisioned in the MOA-AD]”. G.R. no. 183591, The 
Province of North Cotabato vs. The Government of the Repub-
lic of the Philippines, 14 October 2008. 
45 Crisis Group interview, government negotiator, Manila, 30 
September 2011. 
46 This is because the MILF views the constitution as biased 
towards a unitary state. As the chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal 
wrote in his 2007 book (under the pen name Salah Jubair): “The 
Constitution is not an even-handed framework to resolve the 
Moro Problem, because most if not all of the framers, the inter-
preters, and implementers, do not have Moro interests in their 
hearts. The Constitution epitomizes the interests of the non-
Moros in this country, which is always dubbed as the national 
interest of the country”. Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: 
Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (Cotabato City, 2007), p. 15. 
47 Crisis Group Briefing, The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, 
op. cit., p. 4. In late 2008, The Asia Foundation conducted sur-
veys in ARMM, Cotabato City and Isabela City, and rural areas 
included in category A and outside. One finding is that rural 
areas in category A were largely ambivalent about expansion 
outside ARMM. “Public Opinion on the Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain and the Peace Process”, The 
Asia Foundation, 2008. 
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istration thought it could persuade the MILF to go for a 
smaller, but more governable space.48 
In late August 2012, the government disclosed its offer to 
the International Contact Group. If the MILF insisted on 
rejecting ARMM and creating the new Bangsamoro gov-
ernment, a new autonomous region would have to be cre-
ated from scratch, and there would have to be a new pleb-
iscite.49 The catch was that the vote would have to be held 
throughout the “core area”, meaning the present ARMM 
plus anywhere outside. The government explained that the 
MILF would be told there was no way around the consti-
tutional requirements on the creation of autonomous re-
gions.50 If the members of the central committee, the top 
decision-making body, agreed, they would be taking a huge 
risk. A plebiscite, long conceived as a way for new areas to 
opt in, could in effect become a way for the provinces cur-
rently in ARMM to opt out.  
The danger is real because, as an experiment in regional 
autonomy, ARMM has been an unmitigated disaster. It 
has become synonymous with corruption and inefficiency 
and has frequently been a vehicle for Manila to meddle in 
Bangsamoro politics. It has also failed utterly to foster 
any greater regional cohesion between Central Mindanao 
and the far-flung Sulu archipelago. The Bangsamoro gov-
ernment envisioned in the framework agreement may not 
work any better.  
At the September round, the MILF took the news in stride 
that a new vote would be required.51 A negotiator explained 
that the problem was not a plebiscite per se, but whether 
 
48 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, 10 Feb-
ruary 2011. 
49 In terms of the necessary legislation, the basic law would 
therefore be a new organic act, rather than an amendment to the 
organic act that created ARMM (Republic Act 6734) in 1989 
[see fn. 1 and 3]. Because the MILF would be creating a new 
region through the basic law, this would be markedly different 
than the legislation that resulted from the MNLF peace process, 
which was an amendment (Republic Act 9054) to the original 
organic act.  
50 Crisis Group interviews, September-October 2012. “The cre-
ation of the autonomous region shall be effective when ap-
proved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in 
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, 
cities, and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebi-
scite shall be included in the autonomous region”. 1987 Philip-
pine Constitution, Article X, Section 18. 
51 Before the sessions got underway, the Malaysian facilitator 
sat down with Marvic Leonen and Mohagher Iqbal, the chief 
negotiators for each side. Leonen explained the government’s 
offer, emphasising the legal and constitutional issues regarding 
plebiscites. The two men agreed that they should take territory 
off the agenda, but continue with all the other items. Crisis Group 
interviews, various individuals involved in the negotiations, 
Manila, September-October 2012. 
the government’s legal reasoning was sound.52 But in the 
eyes of other members of the MILF team, it was simply 
unfair. The Bangsamoro had to be bigger than ARMM; it 
was unconscionable that after years of negotiations and 
fighting, the MILF could end up with a smaller area. If prov-
inces and municipalities in ARMM did not want to join the 
Bangsamoro, that was because Manila had never tried to 
get regional autonomy to work properly; it had nothing to 
do with the MILF. Yet the latter’s credibility would be at 
stake in the plebiscite. In contrast, the process envisioned 
in the MOA-AD did not risk loss of territory.53  
After internal deliberations, the MILF accepted the gov-
ernment’s argument and agreed to a vote in all areas to be 
included in the Bangsamoro, including ARMM.54 This 
was a major concession. According to a negotiator, the 
MILF’s top decision-makers were willing to accept law-
yerly arguments about constitutional requirements, and 
realised that in return the central committee would have 
to be bold: “Revolutionary leaders take risks but lawyers 
are cowards!”55 
The plebiscite is a gamble, but otherwise the terms are 
better for the MILF than they first appear. The “core area” 
defined in the framework agreement is in fact larger than 
in the MOA-AD.56 The difference lies in where a plebiscite 
will be held. Although not spelled out in the framework 
agreement, there are only 39 barangays in North Cotabato 
that voted in favour in the 2001 plebiscite, far fewer than 
the hundreds that were to vote according to the 2008 pact. 
But an additional article in the framework agreement leaves 
the possibility of further expansion open:  
Areas which are contiguous and outside the core terri-
tory where there are substantial populations of the 
Bangsamoro may opt anytime to be part of the territo-
ry upon petition of at least 10 per cent of the residents 
and approved by a majority of qualified voters in a 
plebiscite.57 
 
52 Crisis Group interview, member of the MILF negotiating 
team, Manila, 11 September 2012. 
53 Crisis Group interviews, members of the MILF negotiating 
team, September 2012. 
54 To help the central committee think through the constitution-
al issues, the MILF quietly approached members of the Interna-
tional Contact Group to ask them to bring in external experts who 
could come to Camp Darapanan, the MILF leadership’s base. 
Crisis Group interviews, September-October 2012. The Malay-
sian facilitator was in nearby Cotabato City at the time of the 
deliberations. 
55 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiator, Cotabato City, 30 
October 2012. 
56 As noted above, this was only ARMM and the six municipal-
ities in Lanao del Norte. 
57 Framework Agreement, op. cit., Section V (Territory), Arti-
cle 3. 
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This saves face for the MILF, as its leaders can claim they 
have not, for the most part, given up any territory. The are-
as listed in the failed 2008 agreement can still join, but now 
there is a two-step process: they must opt in first, and then 
vote to join.58 
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANGSAMORO 
AND POWERS 
The framework agreement explains the objectives of the 
peace process more simply than any other text previously 
reached with the MILF. It states unequivocally that “the 
status quo is unacceptable and … the Bangsamoro shall be 
established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao”. The new government shall have a ministerial 
form, whose electoral system will encourage formation of 
“genuinely principled political parties”. The privileges of 
the provinces and municipalities within the Bangsamoro 
“shall not be diminished unless otherwise altered, modified 
or reformed for good governance”. And, crucially, “the re-
lationship of the Central Government with the Bangsamoro 
Government shall be asymmetric”.59 
The last article steers clear of language that sunk the MOA-
AD. That agreement had used “associative”, which was fur-
ther explained to mean “shared authority and responsibil-
ity”.60 The Supreme Court determined that it implied either 
a relationship between two sovereign entities, or transitory 
phase for an entity that would later become independent.61 
When peace talks resumed in late 2009, the MILF began 
describing its desired political arrangement as a “sub-state”, 
which the Aquino government also disliked. It needed to 
find wording that suggested the new regional government 
would enjoy extensive powers in order to satisfy the MILF, 
but without alarming conservative nationalists who fear a 
peace agreement is a rest stop on the road to independence. 
“Sub-state” does not appear anywhere in the framework 
agreement. Yet, because nothing else is spelled out, the 
MILF can read what it wants into “asymmetry” in defending 
 
58 Because the areas must be contiguous, the barangays in plac-
es like Davao Oriental on the other side of Mindanao that were 
included in the MOA-AD cannot join. But the framework 
agreement also gives the Bangsamoro government the option of 
providing assistance to these communities. Ibid, Section VI 
(Basic Rights), Article 4. 
59 Ibid, Section I (Establishment of the Bangsamoro), Articles 
1-4. 
60 Crisis Group Briefing, The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, 
op. cit., pp. 5-6.  
61 For example, the court noted, “while there may be a sem-
blance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE 
and the national government, the act of placing a portion of 
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, 
has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly 
not conducive to national unity”. G.R. no. 183591, op. cit. 
the new pact to its base. A government official believes the 
central committee members need to be able to say they are 
“still aspiring for a sub-state without calling it a sub-state”.62 
A forthcoming annex on power sharing will have to clarify 
what an “asymmetric” relationship means, while avoiding 
possible constitutional challenges. Some clarity will come 
from a list of exclusive, reserved and shared powers that will 
determine which government (Bangsamoro or Manila) con-
trols what. This is still under negotiation. A government of-
ficial complained that the MILF does not think about what 
is reasonable and practical: its negotiators are focused on 
which list in the chart of powers is the longest.63 
Details in the framework agreement on powers are sparse.64 
The most interesting provisions pertain to Sharia (Islamic 
law) and accreditation of halal-certifying bodies, which will 
determine what food, drugs and cosmetics are permissible 
under Islamic law. The agreement mentions that the Sharia 
justice system is to be strengthened and its jurisdiction ex-
panded, although it will only apply to Muslims.65 How the 
MILF interprets Islamic law and envisions its enforcement 
remains unclear.66 Some civil society groups in Central Min-
danao are already concerned about how an Islamic system 
will work, especially if the central committee appoints a con-
servative religious leader to the transition commission.67 
For the MILF, the agreement’s main selling point is the 
ministerial government based on a party system, which it 
argues will open up space for different political actors. Sup-
porters of the deal concur: this will dismantle the existing 
power structures within ARMM that work to the benefit 
of extended families that thrive on patronage politics and 
 
62 Crisis Group interview, Manila, 25 October 2012. 
63 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
25 October 2012. 
64 It reiterates some of the text from the April 2012 declaration, 
for example, a preliminary list of Manila’s powers, including 
defence and external security; foreign policy; common market 
and global trade, barring certain powers already enjoyed by 
ARMM; coinage and monetary policy; citizenship and naturali-
sation; and postal service. Framework Agreement, op. cit., Sec-
tion III (Powers), Article 2. 
65 Ibid, Section III (Powers), Articles 3-5. 
66 In the negotiations, the MILF was primarily concerned about 
the lack of an appellate court with expertise in Sharia. Crisis 
Group telephone interview, 9 October 2012; Crisis Group in-
terview, senior government official, Manila, 25 October 2012. 
67 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Cotabato City, 
27 October 2012. For an analysis of the Sharia courts that cur-
rently exist in the Philippines, and the MILF’s shadow court 
system, see Matthew Stephens, “Islamic Law in the Philip-
pines: Between Appeasement and Neglect”, Islam, Syari’ah 
and Governance Background Paper Series, University of Mel-
bourne, 2011.  
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are wholly unaccountable to the electorate.68 Although the 
idea of a parliamentary-style regional government coexist-
ing with the presidential system in Manila has attracted some 
criticism, the Aquino administration checked with members 
of Congress, particularly influential senators, before mak-
ing the offer to the MILF to ensure they would not oppose 
it.69 Government negotiators are adamant it is constitutional. 
The shift to a political party system paves the way for MILF 
leaders and supporters to form a party themselves and com-
pete in the first regular elections in 2016. At a press confer-
ence shortly after the framework agreement was signed, 
Chairman Murad explained that the MILF will continue to 
exist, but as an Islamic organisation and said that the central 
committee had yet to decide whether it would form a sepa-
rate party.70 Despite his non-committal statement, a major 
reason why the MILF wanted to be in power during a long 
transition was that its future candidates needed the time to 
build such a party and to prove they could govern before 
standing against the well-established players in the region.71  
D. REVENUE GENERATION AND  
WEALTH SHARING 
This section of the framework agreement has considerable 
details on fiscal policy and powers of taxation but is nota-
ble largely for what it lacks: a percentage split between the 
Bangsamoro government and Manila on revenues from natu-
ral resources. The wealth-sharing annex will likely contain 
the numbers. The most important reference point is the 75:25 
 
68 On the personalised nature of Philippine politics, see Alfred 
McCoy (ed), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the 
Philippines (Madison, 2009). On the gross abuse of power by 
one family in Central Mindanao, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing 
N°98, The Philippines: After the Maguindanao Massacre, 21 
December 2009. On the failure of political parties in ARMM, 
see Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Bangsamoro attempts in build-
ing political parties”, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, Septem-
ber 2008. 
69 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
27 January 2012. The government and the MILF discussed the 
ministerial structure in late 2011. It was one of the first major 
issues they agreed on. The failure to consult Congress during 
the negotiations of the MOA-AD was a major reason why the 
government’s critics in Manila were virulently opposed. For 
criticism of the ministerial government, see Nelson Laviña, 
“Agreement of the parties”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 No-
vember 2012. 
70 Press conference with Chairman Murad, Camp Darapanan, 
Maguindanao, 27 October 2012. 
71 Crisis Group interview, former Arroyo government official, 
Davao, 23 March 2012. Here again the experience of the 
MNLF is instructive. A handful of its leaders are in elected of-
fice, but they operate in ways that are no different to the other so-
called traditional politicians from the most prominent families.  
split agreed in the MOA-AD.72 The government and long-
time observers of the peace process feel the MILF is focused 
on the wrong things. As an Aquino administration official 
remarked, “the reality is that the national government will be 
subsidising the Bangsamoro for the next twenty years … the 
MILF seems to think they’ll just put a pipe in the ground 
and oil will spurt out”.73 The parties are also still haggling 
over powers of taxation; the MILF wants the Bangsamoro 
government to be able to raise its own revenues. But others 
think the emphasis on taxation in one of the poorest areas 
in the country is misplaced: “No one is paying their taxes 
properly, and in the first place there’s nothing to tax”.74 
Another controversial issue is the fate of the direct cash 
transfer from Manila to provinces and municipalities. The 
right to control this money, known as the internal revenue 
allotment, drives cutthroat competition at election time 
because it is one of the biggest single spoils available to 
victors at the local level; ARMM has no control over the 
funds.75 The MILF would like the wealth-sharing annex 
to make clear that all internal revenue allotments will be 
flowing through the Bangsamoro government, thereby 
lessening the power of provincial and municipal govern-
ments. The MILF knows it will need the support of pro-
vincial governors and mayors for the plebiscite, and its 
negotiators will have to be pragmatic about their demand 
for control – or so the government believes.76 If the parties 
do not resolve the issue in the annexes, it will fall to the 
transition commission.  
E. NORMALISATION 
“Normalisation” is a catch-all term used in the negotiations 
to describe the return to normal life through reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, transitional justice and improvement of the 
security situation – all of which are mentioned in the final 
 
72 “The BJE take or profit split from total production shall be 
shared with the Central Government on a percentage ratio of 
75:25 in favor of the BJE. All royalties, bonuses, taxes, charges, 
custom duties or imposts on natural resources and mineral re-
sources shall be shared by the Parties on a percentage ratio of 
75:25 in favor of the BJE”. Memorandum of Agreement, op. cit.  
73 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
25 October 2012. Interviews with MILF members and support-
ers suggest that most think the route to fiscal autonomy lies in 
tapping the gas reserves believed to lie beneath a vast marsh in 
Maguindanao. There are no reliable estimates of potential oil 
reserves or geothermal resources. See “MILF: Put off oil explo-
ration bids in Liguasan”, Rappler.com, 30 October 2012; “DOE 
prepares inventory of energy resources in Bangsamoro area”, 
Interaksyon.com, 17 October 2012.  
74 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Manila, 25 October 2012. 
75 Crisis Group interview, individual close to the MILF, Co-
tabato City, 27 October 2012. 
76 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
25 October 2012. 
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substantive section of the framework agreement. These are 
important because such issues have never previously been 
included in a signed text between the parties. The deal also 
mentions cooperation to reduce firearms and disband private 
armies and other armed groups. But the MILF and the gov-
ernment – as well as many observers77 – are worried about 
three issues that will be the focus of a forthcoming annex: 
 The creation of a civilian, effective, impartial and fair 
“police force for the Bangsamoro”, which will be re-
sponsible to Manila, the Bangsamoro government and 
the communities it serves. An independent commission, 
drawing on local and international expertise, will make 
recommendations on policing.78 
 The gradual decommissioning of MILF forces.79 The 
parties also agreed to institute programs for MILF com-
batants, and to attract multi-donor country support to 
help “combatant and non-combatant” elements of the re-
bel movement return to normal life.80 
 The phased and gradual handover of law enforcement 
functions from the Philippine military to the new po-
lice force. In the interim, the MILF will assist in main-
taining peace and order.81 
Policing is a priority for both sides. The hard part will be 
defining the powers the Bangsamoro government will 
have vis-à-vis Manila. MILF negotiators are pushing for 
the ability to recruit, train, control, promote and “incul-
cate values” in the police. They know policing is not easy 
but want to be able to exercise the powers soon.82 The 
government’s thinking on the issue is still preliminary be-
cause its negotiators were never clear what the MILF 
wanted. A senior official said the Aquino administration 
thought that, as an autonomous region, the Bangsamoro 
could have full police powers, but it would depend on the 
timeframe. Does the MILF expect full powers handed 
 
77 The International Contact Group is trying to bring in outside 
expertise to nudge the positions closer together. There have 
been several visits to Camp Darapanan by individuals involved 
in Northern Ireland’s peace process, and the experience of the 
British government in decommissioning and policing there in-
formed language used in the framework agreement. Crisis Group 
interview, Manila, October 2012. Both parties have also visited 
Spain to learn about the structure of its overlapping police forces. 
Members of the International Contact Group say they worry 
about how relevant some of these examples are for the Philip-
pines. Crisis Group interviews, Manila, May, July, August 2012. 
78 Framework Agreement, op. cit., Section VIII, Articles 3-4. 
79 Ibid, Article 5. 
80 Ibid, Articles 10-11. 
81 Ibid, Articles 6-7. 
82 “We are not saying that in the first year [the Bangsamoro po-
lice force] will be doing well”. Crisis Group interview, member 
of the MILF negotiating team, Cotabato City, 28 October 2012. 
over immediately or after a couple of years?83 Another 
issue is that the constitution permits only one police force, 
although it does provide for devolution to local executives, 
meaning provincial governors and mayors.84 This is the op-
posite of what the MILF wants, however, and it may be 
difficult to claw back oversight of the police from these 
politicians. 
The Aquino government implicitly recognised that the 
MILF controls territory in Central Mindanao and provides 
security to communities in the framework agreement. The 
pact suggests fighters will help maintain peace and order 
while decommissioning is underway. But sceptics note there 
are plenty of thugs under the organisation’s umbrella who 
should not be allowed to play any kind of policing role, 
formally or informally. The MILF understands these con-
cerns, and says that corrupt local police cannot simply be 
replaced with an abusive regional force. The tricky bit will 
be determining the degree of oversight by Manila and the 
form of a new regional police force.  
The MILF appears interested in community policing, or a 
“people’s police”.85 The government sees problems with 
this idea, particularly because of land conflicts called rido 
that frequently arise between local commanders or within 
the broader community of supporters, where a neutral third 
party needs to intervene.86 Still, both parties are more will-
ing than ever before to view crime, extortion and political 
violence as issues they must tackle together. This in turn 
has opened up space for external input on policing, which 
could help professionalise the new force.87 
 
83 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, 4 Sep-
tember 2012. 
84 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section XVI, Article 6: “The 
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall 
be national in scope and civilian in character, to be adminis-
tered and controlled by a national police commission. The au-
thority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdic-
tion shall be provided by law”. Republic Act 7160, known as 
the 1991 local government code, further explains that provin-
cial governors and mayors of municipalities and cities (an ad-
ministrative distinction in the Philippines – in effect cities en-
joy more local autonomy than municipalities) “exercise general 
and operational control over the local police force”.  
85 Crisis Group interviews, MILF negotiators, Manila and Co-
tabato City, 11 September and 28 October 2012. 
86 Crisis Group interview, government negotiator, Manila, 5 
November 2012. These rido are the main cause of frequent 
small-scale displacement in Central Mindanao. They can esca-
late rapidly into more serious fighting depending on who is in-
volved and whether the military takes sides.  
87 Some interested donors see the Bangsamoro police force as a 
way to engage the Aquino government in a discussion on secu-
rity sector issues in the Philippines more broadly. Crisis Group 
interview, Manila, 25 October 2012. 
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The framework agreement also commits the MILF to 
gradually “decommission” its forces but the negotiators 
did not mean demobilisation, disarmament and reintegra-
tion (DDR).88 Neither the MILF nor the government likes 
the term and both are only beginning to think about the 
broader concept – the idea of dismantling rebel groups by 
providing socio-economic assistance to smooth the return 
of combatants to their families and normal jobs – as well 
as a concomitant reduction of military presence in Bang-
samoro areas.89 Discussions in mid-November, the first 
time the parties met since the framework agreement was 
signed, touched on the idea of a trust fund for ex-combatants 
and victims.90 
The negotiating teams are rightly proud of the agreement, 
which reflects creativity and flexibility on both sides. For 
years it was unclear whether the government and the MILF 
would ever be able to agree on a final peace. Now they at 
least have a preliminary sketch.  
 
88 DDR in the Philippines has tended to be closely associated 
with counter-insurgency efforts by the military. See “Discours-
es, Views and Experiences on Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration: International and Local Perspective”, OPAPP, 
September 2009. In 2004, the UN Development Programme 
commissioned a desk review by a DDR expert on potential pro-
grams for the MILF. See Robert Muggah, “The Prospects for 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front”, desk review commissioned by UNDP, 
March 2004. 
89 Crisis Group interviews, Manila, September-October 2012. 
The International Contact Group has brought DDR experts and 
others with expertise in policing to speak to both parties. 
90 “Trust fund, other issues hindering peace talks”, Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 19 November 2012. 
IV. DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE 
Not surprisingly, the two sides approached the agreement 
from perspectives that reflected both different constituen-
cies and competing priorities. 
From the outset, the reform-minded Aquino administra-
tion saw an agreement with the MILF as part of a broader 
approach to Mindanao known as the “convergence strate-
gy”.91 First, the government would try to secure a final 
peace with the MILF, while consulting other stakehold-
ers. Second, it would tie up the loose ends of the 1996 
agreement that many argued had never been fully imple-
mented.92 Third, it would partner with local politicians 
and civil society to improve the functioning of ARMM.93 
From its perspective, there were several challenges. One 
was the division among the Bangsamoro themselves. Un-
less some degree of unity could be forged, any agreement 
was doomed. Manila was also concerned about the per-
ceived undemocratic nature of the negotiations, in which 
the MILF asserted that what it proposed in confidential 
discussions in Malaysia was automatically the desire of 
the Bangsamoro. The international facilitators often knew 
more about proposals under discussion than did the Fili-
pino or Bangsamoro people. Finally, the government was 
concerned about the MILF’s lack of governing experience 
and what this might mean for a future entity.94 
The MILF thought the government was far too worried 
about internal politics among the Bangsamoro.95 As far as 
it was concerned, the convergence strategy distracted atten-
tion from the peace process – which it saw as the key to solv-
ing all of Mindanao’s problems. Everything else was minor 
or would fall into place once an agreement was reached. 
 
91 Crisis Group Briefing, A New Strategy for Peace in Minda-
nao?, op. cit. 
92 During President Arroyo’s term, the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) had begun a tripartite review to respond to 
the MNLF’s complaints that the government had failed to fully 
implement the 1996 agreement, which Indonesia had brokered 
under OIC auspices. See Crisis Group Briefings, Back to the 
Table, Warily, in Mindanao, and A New Strategy for Peace in 
Mindanao?, both op. cit. 
93 For more on the ARMM reform initiative, see Crisis Group 
Report, Local Politics in the Sulu Archipelago and the MILF 
Peace Process, op. cit. 
94 Donors share these concerns and the UN and World Bank 
have proposed a technical facility to provide support to the 
MILF as it drafts the basic law and begins to develop priorities 
for the transition. 
95 The MILF and its supporters felt that the Bangsamoro could 
come together of their own volition; outsiders – including the 
government – should not be the ones pushing the MILF to co-
operate with the MNLF, local politicians, indigenous peoples, 
etc. Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City, October-November 
2011 and January, March 2012. 
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Manila in its view was too focused on players like the 
MNLF with no political clout or ability to credibly threat-
en the use of force. The government was likewise too 
preoccupied with an institution, the ARMM, that was ir-
redeemably bad because of the structural flaws of existing 
autonomy arrangements. Even worse, Aquino’s reform 
agenda was trying to turn power-hungry, unaccountable 
politicians from the region’s major political families into 
champions of good governance and development. 
The MILF, like the MNLF before it, sees the Bangsamoro 
as one nation struggling for self-determination, while the 
Aquino government perceives a region deeply divided along 
family, ethnic, geographic, religious, political and sectoral 
lines. It acknowledged that strengthening autonomy and 
letting the MILF lead a transition was the only way to get 
the fighters to lay down their weapons, but it had doubts 
about how well this would work in practice. Manila felt 
obliged to create space for non-MILF Muslims. It was par-
ticularly worried about the unwillingness of political figures 
in the Sulu archipelago, whose populations are ethnically 
distinct from the Maguindanaon and Maranao that predom-
inate among the MILF from Central Mindanao, to be under 
a new regional government of the MILF’s making.96 
The government and the MILF also have very different 
ideas on transition and territory. In public, both say the 
transition commission is a vehicle for including other per-
spectives on the future Bangsamoro government. But the 
MILF still wants to singlehandedly determine the content 
of the basic law and may be able to do so as chair of the 
commission. To this end, its eight appointees will likely 
include individuals from the formal negotiating panel and 
others selected for their “commitment to the struggle” which 
means people the central committee can control and trusts.97 
The government thinks the MILF will have to negotiate the 
basic law with the other Bangsamoro on the commission, 
 
96 The MNLF, when it was first negotiating with the govern-
ment in the 1970s, could more credibly say it had support from 
a wide cross-section of Muslim Mindanao. After the MILF 
formally split off in 1984, the MNLF, dominated by the Tausug 
of the Sulu archipelago, never regained its strength in Central 
Mindanao. See Crisis Group Report, Local Politics in the Sulu 
Archipelago and the MILF Peace Process, op. cit. 
97 There are no restrictions on dual appointments – to the nego-
tiating panel and the transition commission – so far. Crisis 
Group interviews, individuals in the negotiations, Manila and 
Cotabato City, October-November 2012. MILF negotiators 
downplay the need for technocrats or legal training; they say 
there will be a secretariat to provide support on such matters. 
Crisis Group interviews, MILF negotiators, Cotabato City, 28 
and 30 October 2012. The MILF says it will make public its 
appointees by mid-December 2012 and they will include a 
woman and an indigenous person. “MILF members of Transi-
tion Commission known by mid-December”, Luwaran.com, 23 
November 2012. 
which would likely moderate its demands. Manila is not 
looking to dictate a stance to its appointees,98 who will prob-
ably include someone from the MNLF; someone from civil 
society; an indigenous person who self-identifies as Bang-
samoro; and possibly a sitting member of Congress.99 The 
government will also need to think of the Sulu archipelago, 
as most MILF appointees will be from Central Mindanao.100  
On the surface, the eventual plebiscite is a constitutional 
requirement that will boost the popular legitimacy of new 
autonomy arrangements by securing the consent of the 
majority of Bangsamoro. For the government, it is also a 
means of forcing the MILF to consider others, especially 
the powerful politicians from the Sulu archipelago, in 
drafting the basic law. If the MILF ignores dissenting 
voices, it will risk losing the islands in the vote.101 But be-
fore it agreed, this is precisely what the MILF was pri-
vately worried about: the plebiscite was a ploy by Manila 
to placate the local politicians from the islands and give 
them a way to opt out.102 
 
98 Crisis Group interview, government negotiator, Manila, 5 
November 2012. 
99 Crisis Group interviews, Manila, October-November 2012. 
Prospective candidates are already lobbying the peace process 
office. The appointment process will probably be similar to that 
used for the caretaker regional legislative assembly in early 
2012, in which the president’s advisers tried to strike a balance 
among ARMM’s political forces. 
100 For a prominent civil society organisation’s proposed criteria 
for appointees, see “Support six-point criteria for the transition 
commission”, Mindanao Peoples Caucus, 16 November 2012. 
101 Crisis Group interviews, Manila, September-October 2012. 
102 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiator, Manila, 11 Septem-
ber 2012.  
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V. FUTURE HURDLES 
It is difficult to predict at this stage whether the frame-
work agreement will produce a lasting peace. The political 
environment is far more favourable than it was when the last 
agreement collapsed in 2008. This time around the presi-
dent is popular, has slightly over half his term left, and has 
shown that he is committed to peace with the MILF. But 
it is clear that there are serious obstacles on the horizon, in-
cluding whether the basic law will be compatible with the 
constitution; possible opposition from Christians, indige-
nous peoples and the Sulu archipelago; the potential for an 
MILF splinter to grow if implementation stalls; and the 
future of MILF fighters and their weapons. 
A. THE CONSTITUTION 
If it is not possible to establish the Bangsamoro govern-
ment within the bounds of the constitution, then the 1987 
charter will have to be revised or amended. Otherwise, 
the peace process will fail. The MILF and the Aquino 
government have different views on the flexibility of the 
constitution.  
For the government, the Supreme Court ruling on the MOA-
AD is instructive. The 2008 agreement acknowledged that 
its terms went beyond the “existing legal framework”, im-
plying that many of its provisions could only take effect 
after the constitution was revised.103 The court determined 
that, as part of the peace process, the president could encour-
age his or her negotiators to consider options requiring con-
stitutional amendment but that he or she could not unilat-
erally implement such changes. The president can, however, 
make recommendations to Congress or to the Philippine 
people, which are uniquely vested with the powers to amend 
or revise the constitution.104 The court ruled that President 
Arroyo exceeded her authority by in effect guaranteeing 
to the MILF that the constitution would be changed in line 
with the terms of the MOA-AD.105 
 
103 See the 2008 MOA-AD, Governance strand, Article 7. The 
Supreme Court noted that the text does not directly refer to the 
constitution, but that “the existing legal framework” could en-
compass the constitution. G.R. no. 183591, op. cit. 
104 Congress, a constitutional convention (which Congress can 
convene or ask the electorate to vote on convening one), or the 
people (through a petition known as a “people’s initiative”) can 
propose amendments or revisions to the constitution. Any 
changes must be ratified in a countrywide plebiscite. 1987 Phil-
ippine Constitution, Article XVII. 
105 “Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on Governance is incon-
sistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose con-
stitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the 
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines 
will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the ‘consensus points’ 
The Aquino government knows a final peace with the 
MILF may be impossible without changing the constitu-
tion but is skittish about potential opposition. In the nego-
tiations, the president needed to make sure his team did 
not agree to anything that would suggest he was promis-
ing the MILF a constitutional amendment that he could 
not deliver.106 However, government negotiators told the 
MILF that the president was open to an amendment, but 
wanted an incremental approach. He first needed to know 
if the 1987 constitution could accommodate all the powers 
the MILF wants in the basic law. If not, then he would be 
willing to consider a constitutional amendment.107 Consti-
tutional problems will likely only become apparent once the 
basic law is complete; this explains why the transition com-
mission will also draw up proposed amendments. It is un-
clear if the president views it as his role to lobby Congress 
on constitutional change.108 Statements by government offi-
cials suggest the MILF and the transition commission would 
have to lead the campaign.109 
The MILF does not want the Bangsamoro to be limited 
by the constitution’s provisions on local government and 
autonomous regions.110 It believes that the future Bang-
samoro government’s ministerial structure and powers to 
hold elections, run the police and oversee the provinces 
and municipalities in its area will be incompatible with 
 
found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as un-
constitutional”. G.R. no. 183591, op. cit. 
106 Since the framework agreement was unveiled, his spokes-
men and ministers have repeatedly reinforced that its terms are 
constitutional. “Cha-cha not needed to implement Bangsamoro 
deal – Palace exec”, GMA-News, 26 October 2012. 
107 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
27 January 2012. 
108 Some politicians are also trying to push for amendment of 
the constitution’s economic provisions, which limit foreign in-
vestment. President Aquino does not believe this is necessary. 
“Enrile calls for changes in economic provisions of PHL Con-
stitution”, GMA-News, 23 July 2012. 
109 For example, presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda ex-
plained, “you and I, as ordinary citizens, we can propose 
amendments to the Constitution …. That is the same right and 
that is found in the Constitution, and that is also provided to any-
body who would like to suggest amendments”. “Cha-cha not 
needed to implement Bangsamoro deal – Palace exec”, op. cit. 
110 In 2008, the Supreme Court objected to precisely what the 
MILF wants: “No province, city, or municipality, not even the 
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ‘associa-
tive’ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the 
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted 
by the Constitution to any local or regional government”. G.R. 
no. 183591, op. cit. In early December, two petitions were filed 
with the Supreme Court protesting the terms of the framework 
agreement. “Petitions filed vs Bangsamoro Framework deal”, 
Sun-Star, 3 December 2012. 
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the constitution, once elaborated in the basic law.111 Apart 
from the legal technicalities, the MILF has political rea-
sons to push for an amendment. First, it would prove once 
and for all that its leaders drove a harder bargain than the 
MNLF in 1996. Second, it worries about securing the 
gains of the peace process for future generations. As a 
negotiator put it: “Now we have a very good president, 
who wants to give power to the Moros …. But that’s why 
we need to change the constitution so another president 
cannot take away all these things and leave us naked”.112 
The MILF signed the framework agreement because it 
understood the president’s wait-and-see approach and be-
lieved he was willing to revisit the constitutional issue at 
some point before the end of his term.113  
There are several unknowns that could affect how the con-
stitutional issue plays out. Will the transition commission 
produce a basic law that is unconstitutional? Is President 
Aquino really willing to open the issue of constitutional 
change near the end of his term?114 And could the results 
of the 2013 mid-term elections diminish his influence over 
Congress? The latter is crucial because it is the House of 
Representatives and the Senate – not the president – which 
would hold the power to secure a constitutional amendment.  
B. LIKELY MALCONTENTS 
There is cautious optimism across the board in Mindanao 
for now. Many believe the framework agreement has been 
well received so far because the critical details are still to 
be worked out. Spoilers are more likely to agitate against 
the peace process once the transition commission is appoint-
ed and the contours of the basic law become clear. So far, 
no one seems to feel sufficiently threatened by the frame-
work agreement to resort to violence. 
The noisiest opponent, MNLF founder Nur Misuari, has 
little capacity to spoil the process. He resents the MILF for 
 
111 MILF Chairman Murad took a more careful line at a press 
conference. When asked about constitutional change, he ex-
plained that the government says a solution to the Bangsamoro 
problem can be worked out within the constitution, so the MILF 
responded, if it is possible within the constitution, then well and 
good. Murad finished by noting that it remains to be seen if that 
is really the case. Press conference with Chairman Murad, Camp 
Darapanan, Maguindanao, 27 October 2012. 
112 Crisis Group interview, members of the MILF negotiating 
team, Cotabato City, 28 October 2012. 
113 The government had a hard time getting this message through 
to the MILF. Crisis Group interview, senior government official, 
Manila, 27 January 2012. 
114 One of the reasons the MOA-AD was so unpopular was that 
President Arroyo’s opponents believed she was trying to use its 
constitutionally problematic provisions to open the country’s 
charter and lobby for revision of the one-term limit so she could 
stay in power.  
stealing his thunder. But he is largely estranged from the 
organisation he once led and although he still commands 
respect, he does not have any control over any fighters, not 
even those in his home province of Sulu.115 He remains the 
official representative of the Bangsamoro people to the 
OIC, which is now trying to intensify efforts to get him to 
cooperate with the other factional leaders of the MNLF 
and the MILF.116 Misuari’s grumblings attract media atten-
tion, but they signify little because the rest of the MNLF 
plan to take up their remaining concerns about the 1996 
peace agreement through the transition commission.117  
Christians and indigenous peoples have been largely quiet 
since the framework agreement was announced. They are 
willing to give the new pact a chance, but they are still wor-
ried that giving more power to the Bangsamoro will come at 
their expense.118 Two measures could help lessen fears. 
First, the MILF and the government need to ensure com-
munities receive accurate information about the agreement. 
For example, the Aquino administration consulted mayors 
in North Cotabato during the negotiations, so the territorial 
provisions would not come as a surprise; but Christians liv-
ing in and around the “core area” of the Bangsamoro still do 
not understand what the plebiscite will mean.119 As of late 
October 2012, the framework agreement had yet to be 
translated into local languages, or disseminated via radio 
or other means to more remote areas where indigenous peo-
ples live.120 Second, the transition commission should have 
 
115 After the 1996 agreement, Misuari served as ARMM gover-
nor until 2001. His authority rapidly waned as he mismanaged 
the regional government and eventually a group of senior fig-
ures, the “council of fifteen”, ousted him as chairman. 
116 The MNLF and the MILF agreed to create a coordinating 
body at an OIC meeting in Tajikistan in 2010. Since then there 
has been little progress. On 16 November, at the OIC foreign 
ministers’ meeting in Djibouti, Murad met Misuari to discuss a 
Bangsamoro Coordination Forum. “OIC got Nur and Murad to 
sit down for Bangsamoro Coordination Forum”, Mindanews. 
com, 25 November 2012. 
117 Crisis Group interview, MNLF figure, Cotabato City, 31 
October 2012. 
118 Crisis Group interviews, civil society leader working with 
indigenous peoples, journalist and senior church official, Co-
tabato City, 29 and 31 October 2012. 
119 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Cotabato City, 
30 October 2012. They also misunderstood what the agreement 
meant for the armed MILF presence. As a senior church official 
observed, some Christians thought “the MILF signs, and then 
they put their arms in a pile and that’s it”. Crisis Group inter-
view, Cotabato City, 31 October 2012. 
120 Crisis Group interviews, member of the International Con-
tact Group, Manila, 24 October 2012; local journalists, humani-
tarian workers, senior church official, Cotabato City, 29 and 31 
October 2012. The MILF has said that it will translate the doc-
ument. “MILF to translate Framework Agreement into several 
languages”, Luwaran.com, 11 November 2012. 
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a mechanism for consulting Christians and indigenous 
peoples as it drafts the basic law.  
Indigenous peoples, who for the most part are not armed 
or particularly well-organised, are unlikely to oppose the 
framework agreement in a way that would prevent imple-
mentation. Those who already live in ARMM are resigned 
to living under the Bangsamoro government and will look 
for signs that the basic law will allow them to exercise their 
rights under the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act to file for 
and receive titles for their ancestral domains.121 
Christian discontent could be more of a problem. When the 
peace process collapsed in 2008, the first place violence 
erupted was North Cotabato, where MILF fighters clashed 
with Christian militias allied to the military. The area is a 
longstanding flashpoint for conflict in Central Mindanao 
and the MILF and the government need to be vigilant to 
ensure it does not become one again.122 Another place to 
watch is Cotabato City, which twice voted against joining 
ARMM and will vote for a third time on whether to join the 
Bangsamoro. The MILF is adamant the city join the new 
region, given it serves as the economic, transport and ad-
ministrative hub of Central Mindanao. Although the city 
was once 50 per cent Christian, Muslims have dominated 
municipal politics in recent years, likely a reflection of 
changing demographics. Residents believe a plebiscite may 
go in the MILF’s favour this time. Christians in Cotabato 
City are not necessarily opposed to joining but are worried 
about, among other things, whether Manila will supervise 
the new Bangsamoro police force and protection of prop-
erty rights.123  
Since the framework agreement was signed, local politi-
cians in Central Mindanao have been cosying up to the 
MILF to protect their interests. Most political clans are 
focused on getting their candidates elected in the May 
2013 mid-term elections. In pro-MILF areas, nothing can 
be gained from opposing the framework agreement, either 
now or later.  
The major players in the Sulu archipelago are also focused 
on the mid-term polls, but they could become potential 
 
121 See Crisis Group Report, Indigenous Rights and the MILF 
Peace Process, op. cit., and Crisis Group interview, civil socie-
ty activist working with indigenous peoples, Cotabato City, 29 
October 2012. 
122 Violence also flared in Lanao del Norte in 2008, but the 
commander responsible for the attacks, Bravo, has been public-
ly very supportive of the framework agreement. “MILF warrior 
Bravo takes the peace path”, Mindanews.com, 17 November 
2012.  
123 They are worried that the police will be Maguindanaons, 
whom they perceive as the ones committing most of the crimes 
in city. Crisis Group interview, local journalist, Cotabato City, 
29 October 2012. 
spoilers as the plebiscite and the 2016 elections approach. 
The MILF agreed to the territorial provisions assuming 
Manila would pressure the island provinces into joining the 
Bangsamoro.124 It is unclear whether the Aquino govern-
ment is willing or able to do so. 
Some long-time observers of the peace process wonder if 
the otherwise progressive, reform-minded Aquino admin-
istration may be deliberately setting up the MILF by de-
vising a territorial formula that could shrink the size of 
the autonomous region and destroy the leadership’s cred-
ibility.125 The two frontrunners for the 2016 presidential 
election have been antagonists of the MILF in the past, 
although, for now, they are backing the framework agree-
ment.126 Even if Manila wants the Sulu archipelago to join 
the Bangsamoro, it may not have sufficient leverage. Prag-
matic cabinet members say they can “buy” the votes through 
development projects and other financial assistance.127 But 
politics in the Sulu archipelago can be fickle. By the time 
the basic law is ready for popular ratification, the president’s 
influence will have waned in advance of the 2016 elections 
and there could be political mileage in opting out of a new 
autonomy arrangement. The MILF is already trying to reach 
out to Basilan and Tawi-Tawi; Sulu is harder because the 
current kingpin and governor, Sakur Tan, is no friend of 
the MILF.128 
The best option is to persuade the local politicians from the 
Sulu archipelago that, if they can secure a power base in the 
Bangsamoro government, the new arrangement could work 
to their advantage. The MILF wants the political party sys-
tem and ministerial structure to weaken the region’s tradi-
 
124 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiators and members of 
the International Contact Group, Manila and Cotabato City, 
September-October 2012. 
125 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and journalist, Manila, 
August-October 2012. 
126 The current vice-president and future presidential candidate 
for the Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino-Laban (PDP-Laban), 
Jejomar Binay, is close with Joseph Estrada, the former presi-
dent. Estrada launched the first “all-out war” against the MILF 
in 2000, in which the military overran Camp Abu Bakar, the 
nerve centre of MILF training and operations. Estrada is scepti-
cal of the peace process. See “Erap questions Malaysia’s role in 
Moro peace talks”, ABS-CBN News, 19 October 2012. Binay’s 
likely rival in 2016 is Mar Roxas of the Liberal Party, who was 
a staunch opponent of the MOA-AD in 2008. 
127 But the administration lost Secretary Jesse Robredo of the 
Department of Interior and Local Government, its cabinet mem-
ber most able to reach out to them, in a plane crash in late Au-
gust 2012. He has been replaced by Mar Roxas, who is poorly 
equipped to be the administration’s point person with local pol-
iticians. Most observers say he is too arrogant to deal with them 
effectively. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and journalist, 
Manila, August and October 2012. 
128 On Tan see Crisis Group Report, Local Politics in the Sulu 
Archipelago and the Peace Process, op. cit. 
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tional powerbrokers, but there is no guarantee the local 
politicians will not be able to adapt. Someone like Tan, who 
is an astute politician and has demonstrated he can forge 
unlikely alliances within the region, could in fact beat the 
MILF at its own game in the first elections under the new 
system in 2016.129 
C. THE SPECTRE OF A SPLINTER 
A Central Mindanao-based splinter group was a thorn in 
the MILF’s side throughout the negotiations and will re-
main one for some time without, however, posing a serious 
threat to the implementation of the framework agreement. 
In September 2011, the MILF central committee expelled 
a disgruntled but widely respected commander who had 
founded a new group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Movement (BIFM).130 The falling out was not entirely sur-
prising, as Umbra Kato had a history of acting in ways that 
jeopardised the peace process.131 The decision meant the 
BIFM was no longer covered by the ceasefire, but the gov-
ernment’s hands were tied as Kato and his fighters remained 
in MILF-controlled areas where military operations are re-
stricted. The Aquino government was alarmed by what the 
split suggested about the internal cohesion of the MILF 
and frequently raised the issue in the negotiations.132 
Kato was a problem for the MILF leadership because he 
was publicly criticising the lack of progress in the peace 
talks throughout 2011, when they were not going well. 
 
129 Crisis Group interview, member of the International Contact 
Group, Manila, 25 October 2012. Tan hoped to be appointed 
the ARMM governor candidate for Aquino’s Liberal Party and 
built up a diverse coalition to support him. In the end, the pres-
ident chose close personal friend and caretaker ARMM gover-
nor Mujiv Hataman. Whoever wins will be dismissed early, 
whenever ARMM is replaced by the Bangsamoro. 
130 Resolution No. 02/09 Series of 2011, Declaring Ameril Omra 
Kato, his companions and followers are no longer MILF mem-
bers, MILF Central Committee, 22 September 2011. “Muslim 
separatists in Philippines disown rogue commander”, Reuters, 
30 September 2011. 
131 Kato launched an unauthorised attack in January 2005 that 
killed eight soldiers; he was suspended and his base command, 
the 105th, was temporarily deactivated for this serious ceasefire 
violation. In 2008, he was one of the three “renegades” who 
launched attacks against Christian and military targets as the 
MOA-AD collapsed. As a result, he fell out of favour with the 
MILF leadership. See Crisis Group Briefings, The Collapse of 
Peace in Mindanao, and Back to the Table, Warily, in Minda-
nao, both op. cit. 
132 Counter-terrorism experts were also worried because of 
Kato’s extensive contact with foreign jihadis and homegrown 
extremists in the past. Crisis Group Briefings, The Collapse of 
Peace in Mindanao, op. cit., p. 8; and Back to the Table, Warily, 
In Mindanao, op. cit., pp. 6-8.  
He also questioned the central committee for abandoning 
the original goal of independence.133 This is a sensitive 
point because MILF leaders feel their supporters were 
never convinced that this was the right decision. And as 
the negotiations picked up in 2012, the members of the 
central committee knew they would have to make conces-
sions to secure a deal with the cautious Aquino admin-
istration.134 Kato’s criticisms would not help them sell the 
framework agreement to fighters and supporters. But even 
if his views resonated with some, this was not reflected in 
recruitment. No major MILF commanders broke away and 
the BIFM’s numbers never surpassed more than a few 
hundred.135  
In August 2012, the BIFM launched a series of attacks 
against military detachments in Central Mindanao that 
appeared to be an attempt to sabotage the peace talks just 
as they gathered steam. If that was the objective, it failed. 
Sporadic fighting dragged out for weeks and suspicions 
grew that Kato was receiving material assistance from lo-
cal politicians.136 The MILF cooperated with the military 
as soldiers pursued him and his fighters.137  
In the wake of the framework agreement, the BIFM has 
been quiet.138 The MILF and the government should use 
 
133 “Kato: Islam at centre of Moro fight”, Philippine Daily In-
quirer, 20 August 2011. 
134 Crisis Group interviews, MILF negotiators, Manila and Co-
tabato City, 11 September and 28 October 2012. As an MILF 
central committee member explained of the stance in the nego-
tiations, “we have a hard time defending our line internally”. In 
consultations with civil society groups, negotiators have been 
asked whether the pact forecloses the possibility of independ-
ence, and what the MILF will do if its terms are not implement-
ed. Some members of civil society are disappointed that the 
transition is shorter than the MILF wanted. Crisis Group inter-
view, Manila, 25 October 2012; and Crisis Group observations, 
consultation convened by the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil 
Society with MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal, Cotabato 
City, 30 October 2012. 
135 In February 2011, most estimates were less than 100. In late 
August 2012, the estimate was 400. Crisis Group interview, 
diplomat, Manila, 28 August 2012. 
136 See “MILF: 2 Maguindanao pols support Kato”, Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 11 August 2012; “‘A big lie’, Mayor Ampatuan 
says of reports they abandoned towns and supported BIFF”, 
Mindanews.com, 18 August 2012. The politicians strongly de-
nied the allegations. In Mindanao, many people believe that if 
any politicians were involved, they were motivated by political 
concerns ahead of the May 2013 election, not by opposition to 
the peace process. 
137 MILF forces at one point surrounded the troublemakers to 
get them to agree not to launch any further attacks while the 
peace talks were still underway, but they have since loosened 
the cordon. Crisis Group interview, military official, Cotabato 
City, 28 October 2012. 
138 But on 29 September, a week before the framework agree-
ment was announced, the BIFM sent a letter to the MILF cen-
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the ceasefire mechanisms that enable them to share intel-
ligence on troublemakers like Kato, and move forward 
with the framework agreement in the months ahead.139 The 
more promising the peace process seems, the less credi-
bility Kato and the BIFM will have.  
D. THE PROBLEM OF MILF FIGHTERS 
What will become of the MILF’s combatants is still un-
clear. As part of the 1996 agreement with the MNLF, 
thousands of slots were made available for integration in-
to the Philippine military and police. Those integrated were 
mainly relatives of MNLF members, however, while most 
of the rank and file only received livelihood assistance 
and were never disarmed. A promised regional security force 
that would have absorbed many of them never materialised. 
The MILF draws a clear lesson from this counter-example: 
the MNLF fighters were left behind after the 1996 peace 
agreement and this cannot happen to its rank and file.140 
The MILF sees many of its fighters, especially the younger 
ones, being incorporated into a new Bangsamoro police 
force, but not all could join. One option is creating an in-
ternal security force that would quasi-institutionalise the 
MILF armed presence for a limited number of years. A ne-
gotiator said they are open to registering weapons permis-
sible under Philippine law, but want to keep heavier ones, 
such as rocket-propelled grenades and 50-calibre guns for 
a set period. The rationale is that these guns are necessary 
because of the BIFM and heavily armed political families 
who are their enemies.141 But the MILF is also reassuring 
its supporters that it will not disband in case the government 
does not implement the framework agreement.142 
In private, the government is circumspect about disarming 
the MILF. A senior official commented that it is probably 
more important to “contain” their weapons in the short term. 
Another one said that Manila had yet to raise options for 
 
tral committee which declared the group had withdrawn its 
support to the peace process. Crisis Group interview, military 
official, Cotabato City, 28 October 2012. On 26 November, 
bombs in Maguindanao killed one BIFM member and an escort 
of the vice-chairman of political affairs. “Moro rebel killed in 2 
blasts; 7 hurt”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 November 2012.  
139 The mechanism is the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), 
which has existed since January 2005. For details see Crisis 
Group Report, Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in 
Mindanao, op. cit., pp. 10-12. 
140 Crisis Group interview, MILF negotiator, Cotabato City, 28 
October 2012. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Crisis Group observations, consultation convened by the 
Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society with MILF chief ne-
gotiator Mohagher Iqbal, Cotabato City, 30 October 2012. 
disarmament at the negotiating table.143 An optimistic mili-
tary official involved in internal inter-agency discussions 
said that socio-economic assistance will make the difference: 
if you pump enough in, guns will become irrelevant.144  
Implementing a DDR program that tied disarmament and 
demobilisation to assistance to fighters and their families 
would be hard. The biggest problem is that MILF weap-
ons are not the only illegal firearms to be worried about 
in the southern Philippines. Preliminary discussions with-
in government have raised the idea of running simultane-
ous programs to target armed civilians and politicians 
with private armies who are sympathetic to the MILF.145 
The military understands that in return it would need to 
reposition its forces and the locally-based paramilitary 
units it relies upon would also have to go.146 Another ob-
stacle is that neither the MILF nor the government is serious 
about alternative livelihoods, normally the centrepiece of 
reintegration.147 Both parties think retraining commanders 
and foot soldiers is simply too difficult. As a senior official 
remarked, “the line of least resistance” is to find them jobs 
that use their skills with a gun.148 The MILF says that most 
fighters thought they would get jobs in the future Bang-
samoro government.149 Efforts to promote other options will 
struggle to gain traction. 
The biggest obstacles are still a long way off. At this stage, 
optimism is warranted but should not blind anyone to the 
ways in which the peace process could fail. 
 
143 Crisis Group interviews, Manila, 25 October and 5 Novem-
ber 2012. 
144 Crisis Group interview, military official, Cotabato City, 26 
October 2012. 
145 Crisis Group interviews, senior government official, Manila, 
4 September 2012; military official, Cotabato City, 26 October 
2012. 
146 Crisis Group interview, military official, Cotabato City, 28 
October 2012. 
147 It seems likely any large-scale program would only begin 
after the framework agreement is implemented; in the interim, 
donors are working with the government to brainstorm small-
scale quick impact projects that could be carried out with the 
MILF. Crisis Group communications, donor and member of the 
International Contact Group, 5 and 27 November 2012. 
148 Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila, 
4 September 2012. A different official mentioned employing 
them as security guards. Crisis Group interview, Manila, 5 No-
vember 2012. 
149 Crisis Group interviews, MILF negotiators, Cotabato City, 
28 October 2012; MILF supporters, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Ma-
guindanao, 30 October 2012. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The framework agreement is a triumph for the MILF and 
the Philippine government.  
The decision of MILF leaders to move on from the terms 
of the discredited MOA-AD; put their credibility on the 
line with a risky territorial formula; and draft the basic 
law in cooperation with other Bangsamoro proves the depth 
of their commitment to a negotiated peace. They perceived 
that President Aquino wanted a settlement and were willing 
to meet him more than halfway.  
The government deserves credit for ensuring politicians in 
Manila and potential spoilers in Mindanao have been open-
minded, so far, about the framework agreement. President 
Aquino’s popularity – in stark contrast to his predecessor 
– is the government’s greatest asset in the peace process. 
But government officials also thought, throughout the ne-
gotiations, that the MILF was “weak” and lacked legitima-
cy to negotiate on behalf of the Bangsamoro. This is why 
they devised a strategy that would bring other actors in Min-
danao into the peace process and insisted on a territorial 
formula that requires the MILF to rally support rather than 
one that presumes other Bangsamoro accept its leadership.  
The course the framework agreement maps out through 
2016 is a one-way road to greater involvement of other 
political players, first in Mindanao, then in Manila. On 
the bright side, this allows the Bangsamoro to negotiate 
the terms of the basic law among themselves before Con-
gress gets involved. And the MILF now has an opportuni-
ty to prove itself in leading the work of the transition com-
mission. But only time will tell if the parties were right to 
wrap up the formal stage of the negotiations and bring the 
discussions home to Mindanao while key elements of a 
final peace – namely the basic law, the constitutional ques-
tion and the future of MILF forces – are still under debate. 
This could win over sceptics and spoilers, or it could simply 
make it even easier for them to derail the process once and 
for all.  
There is as yet no peace in Mindanao. There could be, but 
only if President Aquino spends his political capital mak-
ing sure that there is support in Congress whenever the 
basic law is ready. The MILF and the transition commis-
sion cannot lobby all the key players in Manila by them-
selves. The framework agreement does not mean that by 
giving the Bangsamoro space to write the basic law, the 
Aquino government can step back, bask in the glow of a 
final peace, and wash its hands of what happens next. The 
MILF and other armed groups in Mindanao have rebelled 
for decades because there is a deeply-rooted anti-Bangsa-
moro bias at the core of the Philippine state. This is why au-
tonomy has always been the only solution and why the 
Bangsamoro cannot achieve it on their own. Peace in the 
country’s troubled south could well be President Aquino’s 
legacy – but only if he stays the course. 
Jakarta/Brussels, 5 December 2012
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